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In 1985, Marcel Gauchet wrote of the ‘retour du religieux’ as an end to
the social role of religion and the beginning of its privatisation. However,
far from an indication of the withering of religion on the vine of
modernity, the return of a religious discourse was resurrected by the
democratisation of the ‘croyant’ in the mid-1980s. The ‘âge égalitaire’,
coupled with the specificity of the ‘croyant’, created a platform on which
to challenge the model of laïcité in contemporary France. This discourse
sought to re-appropriate reason from the logic of secular objectivity and
postmodern self-reliance, and re-signify it within a Catholic theological
language of belief and faith. The transmission of religious ‘knowledge’
would also be seen to compete for intellectual equality with the forms
and transmission of knowledge approved by laïcité in the republican
school. Régis Debray’s report to the Ministry of Education in 2002 on the
teaching of the ‘fait religieux’ in French schools advances this debate by
defending the introduction of the study of religion in school from the
perspectives of theological rigour, the indivisibility of knowledge (the co-
existence of ‘témoin’ and ‘savant’), and the inextricable links between
faith and reason in their production of knowledge with a valid claim for
public consumption.
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Introduction
In 2005 France has celebrated the centenary of the separation of church and
state. One of the principles of this separation has been the protection of
freedom of conscience over religious freedom. Religious ‘cultes’ have continued
to exist freely but they have been shorn of legal and political influence. The
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swing to secularism over the twentieth century, and particularly during les
trente glorieuses, modernised attitudes to sex, freedom and culture, and
provided a framework in which individuals, liberated from the shackles of
the institution of the church, were free to rationalise their own meanings of
existence. In short, the rationale of secularism was seen to find a natural
niche in modernity, and lay the foundations in France for a tradition of
laïque exceptionalism in an otherwise religious and in some cases theocratic
Europe.
In Modernity and Ambivalence (1991), Zygmunt Bauman wrote eloquently
on the terrorism of reason in the structure of modernity. He questioned the
‘innateness’ of religion in the human condition and the insertion of faith in
the secular mindset. In his celebrated work Le Désenchantement du monde
(1985), Marcel Gauchet announced the end of the social role of religion in
modernity, the collapse of the metaphysical and the beginning of a new era
where individuals would be masters of their own destinies. However, this
representation of secularism as antithetical to religion has come under
scrutiny, particularly in what is called our postmodern age. Recent debates
in Britain, North America and France have challenged ways in which
secularism has appropriated the logic of reason to justify its permanence at
the expense of what it sees as theological ‘fiction’. Milbank (1990) and Ward
(1997) in Britain, Meynel (1999) and Stout (2004) in the US, Hervieu-Léger
(1986) Debray (2003a, b) and Valadier (1999) in France have, in their unique
ways, sought to redress a perceived territorialisation of culture, politics and
religious debates within the rationale of secularism. From their respective
positions, each calls for the return of the metanarrative of Christianity as a
rationale for the indeterminacy of postmodernity, and for the reconnection of
knowledge with divine disclosure. 
In contemporary France, religion has been privatised under laïcité and the
division between ‘l’institution de la religion et religiosité vagabonde’ has
widened (Gisel, 1998: 51). However, the loss of status of the church is not
attributable solely to the effects of postmodernity and universal secularism.
Christophe Boureux has argued that the church in France and beyond must
accept that part of its decline is due to the way it has cut itself off from
western culture and simultaneously preached a doctrine of ‘inculturation’1
of other cultures (Boureux, 1997: 235–66). And yet the decline of the church
and religious institutions has not eclipsed religious belief altogether. It is
claimed that there has been an increase in belief, albeit in ‘croyances de
moins en moins messianiques’ (Schlegel, 1997: 5). Traditional forms of
spiritual transcendence are being challenged by what has been called
elsewhere the religion of immanence (Bauman, 1997).2 However, this
cultivation of religion on the fringes of orthodoxy has not thwarted attempts
among intellectuals, notably ‘croyants intellectuels’, to try to reclaim the
centre ground for a traditional religious and Christian discourse. In her
response to a survey carried out by the journal Esprit in 1997 into the future
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of religion in postmodernity, Danièle Hervieu-Léger indicates that religion
must ‘renouer enfin son alliance fondatrice avec la modernité, en travaillant
à la reconstruction du discours chrétien par, et à travers, la reconstruction de
la raison’ (Esprit, 1997: 88). This article will explore the rehabilitation of a
religious discourse through modernity to postmodernity in the context of
secular France. This discourse will seek to challenge the rationale of laïcité,
and particularly its production of knowledge, by locating in faith, belief and
religious study a theological rigour and discipline that will contest the
perceived segregation of knowledge under laïcité.
The historical trajectory 
When Marcel Gauchet introduced the term ‘le retour du religieux’ (Gauchet,
1985), it provoked a wave of debate in the pages of the journal Esprit. In a
special issue called Le Temps des religions sans Dieu in 1997, Jean-Claude
Eslin couched this ‘retour’ within a ‘univers de droits individuels illimités,
le souci de soi, le confort, le bien-être’, in short ‘le retour du privé’ (Eslin,
1997: 12–13). In other words, the ‘retour du religieux’ ushered in an era, not
of religious tradition and devotion, but of a crisis of Christianity in
modernity. According to Alain Touraine, secularism had manufactured a
new and different religious subject, one who had been undone by modernity
and delivered to the fragilities of individualism and communitarianism
(Touraine, 1997: 60). Touraine goes on to say that the traditional religious
subject had been surpassed by a new political one for whom the ‘sacralisation
du social’ had become the new religion of society. Pierre-Olivier Monteil
highlighted the impact of this elevation of the social in the late 1990s,
underlining the dangerous effects of pluralism, relativism and a polytheism
of values. However, he (like Christophe Boureux in the same issue) drew
attention to the idea that relativism does not imply the end of belief. While
belief (‘croire’) may have become displaced by materialism and relativism,
Monteil defines belief as an eternal property of the mind, and as a need for
alterity not to end. He describes belief as going through a process of
‘métabolisation’ and ‘substitution’ under secularism (Monteil, 1997: 269),
with the promise of its refinement in the longer term.
The way postmodernity appears to have displaced religion from the centre
of people’s lives in the late 1990s is in direct contrast to modernity’s
dialectic with religion in the previous decade. In a special issue of Esprit in
1985 entitled Actualités de la religion, the editorial asks its readers if, in the
struggle against the fracturing effects of modernity, the nation’s collective
memory might not be better served focusing on the past and those religious
institutions that have formed collectively the nation’s religious heritage. In
1986, another special issue of Esprit entitled La Religion . . . sans retour ni
détour addressed religious displacement by proposing that religion might
have a more constructive role at the conjuncture of individual and collective
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freedoms (Eslin, Mongin and Schlegel, 1986: 4). It would seem that in the mid-
1980s the ambiguity of the term ‘retour du religieux’ crystallised the nature
of the relationship between secularism and religion in France. This was a
relationship characterised primarily by conjunctures between the individual
and the social, present and past, memory and actuality. Over time, these
conjunctures have intensified, culminating in a ‘rationalisation’ of religion
as a purely individualistic and private pursuit in late modernity and
postmodernity. However, in the course of this trajectory two constants
continue to undermine secular modernity and postmodern relativism. The
first is the invariant that the ‘fait religieux’ is an eternal property of the mind
and that, by implication, belief remains an unfulfilled absolute. The second
is the perception that secularism, in its pursuit of freedom of conscience, has
quarantined the believer, compromised his affinity with a religious community
and obstructed the transmission of a collective religious heritage.
La Revue du MAUSS devoted a special 2003 issue to the debate on
religion entitled Qu’est-ce que le religieux? The arguments played out in
Esprit in the mid-1980s and in subsequent special issues are rehearsed in the
postmodern context in an exchange of articles between Marcel Gauchet,
Alain Caillé and others. Gauchet, in particular, revises his original thesis. He
replaces the celebrated ‘retour du religieux’ with the phrase ‘sortir du
religieux’. This shift reflects his perception that postmodernity has finalised
the end of the structures of religion, that history and tradition have vanished
from the ideological map, and that citizens can now do without religion
without fear or regret. For Gauchet there are new challenges in the
postmodern age which involve organising society ‘hors religion’ and within
what he calls the new universals of science, technology, politics and the
judiciary. However, in a separate article entitled ‘Quelle conception politique
de la religion?’, Gauchet appears to qualify his representation of religion by
coming out in defence of the ways in which it has helped humanity
understand the collective and the social. He writes eloquently of humanity’s
debt to the coherence offered by the ‘mode religieux de structuration des
communautés humaines’ (Gauchet, 2003a: 313), and of how religion has not
only instructed the individual in subservience to power, but how it has also
created the ambition within the individual to want power. The ironic twist,
however, to Gauchet’s argument is that, for him, religion is blessed with a
self-awareness that knows when it has run its course in the postmodern age,
and when to pass on the baton of self-reliance to future generations.
In a later exchange of opinions between Gauchet and Régis Debray in Le
Débat, the latter responds to Gauchet by saying that to opt out of religion is
tantamount to opting out of history. In stressing the permanence of religion
in the world, he invokes (as did Gauchet) the structuring and communitarian
influences of religion. He is critical of modernity and postmodernity and the
roles they have played in removing religion from people’s lives. To this
degree he opposes the positive ‘antérocentré’ focus of religion to the
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‘futurocentré’ ideology after/without religion. In his defence of religion
Debray proceeds to attach to it an identifying structure which is centred on
the use of the ‘sacré’ as ‘une identité d’appartenance’ (Gauchet, 2003c: 3–19).
It is a theme developed by two other contributors to MAUSS. Jacques
Dewitte conceptualises the ‘retour du religieux’ as a need for a return to
signs of sacredness and a cherished language which are perceived to bring
back stability and coherence to what he characterises as postmodernity’s
tyranny of difference: ‘le langage religieux hérité, élaboré au fil des siècles
est sans doute le meilleur accès qu’on puisse y trouver et il ne serait pas
raisonnable de s’en priver’ (Dewitte, 2003: 87). The return of the sacred and
a sacred language are also described as a welcome return to the transfiguring
potential of overly politicised and fractured societies. Jean-Paul Willaime
extends this use of the sacred to a defence of religion as ‘une actualité
symbolique’, and as ‘culture’, where religion is perceived to structure
identities (individual and collective) and produce alternative ways of
understanding. Religion as culture is justified, for Willaime, in respect of
identity, coherence, tradition and autonomy of its determinants (Willaime,
2003: 247–67). We can see from this brief outline that, for the period of les
trente glorieuses, religion occupied what could be described as its natural
place in the modern, secular, republican space – in other words, a private
function of ‘libre pensée’. Postmodernity has accentuated this privatisation
through a process of relativism. But, critically, the democratisation of
republicanism in recent decades has itself relativised the notion of
privatisation in such a way that the traditional republican distinction between
private and public has been undermined by the democratisation of the private
in the public. In the context of contemporary secular France, this process has
helped legitimise a religious ‘croire’ within laïcité. Not only that, but the
emergence of a more structured discourse, around notions of identity, faith
and ‘knowledge’ of a religious heritage, has staked a claim philosophically,
culturally and, as we will see, politically, for its reinsertion into the domains
of secularism and postmodernity. 
Laïcité, specificity and a new religious discourse  
The recent resignation of the European Minister for Justice Rocco Buttiglione
because of his views on women and homosexuals throws a contemporary
light on an old but complex issue, notably the place of religion within
democratic societies. The example of Buttiglione is particularly apt given
recent pronouncements by the Vatican which have called upon Catholics
globally to oppose legislation that jeopardises the doctrines of the Magisterium,
and specifically the conjugality of marriage.3 Buttiglione’s situation also
echoes current debates in MAUSS between Gauchet and Caillé, and in Le
Débat between Debray and Gauchet, about the complexity of the relationship
between ‘le religieux’ and ‘le politique’. For Gauchet, postmodernity has
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enabled politics to stand on its own and create its own governing structures.
In his exchanges with Caillé, he highlights the polarity between religion and
politics, claiming, for example, that religion is secondary to the political and
therefore responsible for constituting humans as dependants rather than
initiators. He summarises this assessment in the phrase: ‘le politique est
instituant, le religieux ne l’est pas. Il est institutionnalisant’ (Gauchet, 2003b:
326). Caillé is less categorical and advocates a closer affiliation between
religion and politics (Caillé, 2003: 315–24). Régis Debray and Gauchet
continue the debate in Le Débat. Debray contests the idea that a democracy
needs to or indeed can divorce itself from religious ideas. He wants to
minimise the political ‘modulations’ that militate against the participation of
religion in democracy. Gauchet, on the other hand, wants to maximise them
as forms of control over religious enchantment. 
In his recent work Democracy and Tradition (2004), Jeffrey Stout, writing
within the context of American political culture, criticises the view that
modern democracies are secularised spheres from which the ‘believer’ must
withdraw. In doing so, he opposes the view of other political scientists,
notably John Rawls (1996) and Richard Rorty (1991), who claim that
democratic participation effectively excludes religious reasoning. The laïque
tradition in France resembles the Rorty and Rawls models. However, we
have seen recently that the affaire du foulard has threatened to compromise
the neutrality of French secularism. Among many things, the affaire
demonstrates that it is inaccurate to depict laïcité as wholly immune to
religion or as a place of secular utopia. Jeffrey Stout makes the following apt
observation in this regard: 
secularisation entails neither the denial of theological assumptions nor
the expulsion of theological expression from the public sphere. And it
leaves believers free to view both the state and democratic culture as
domains standing ultimately under divine judgement and authority. That
believers view the political sphere in this way does not entail that others
will. (Stout, 2004: 93)
I think it would be equally misleading to paint a picture of complete secular
objectivity in a laïque, Christian, Catholic France, where Vatican encyclicals
and letters from bishops are read aloud regularly at Catholic Mass on
Sundays. The Catholic church (with or without the imprimatur of the
Vatican) has a tradition of defending religious/political alliances. In one of
its recent letters (Vatican, 2002), the Vatican calls for Catholics to challenge
actively the secular traditions of France. Invoking reason and rightness, it
claims that ethical pluralism and cultural relativism have undermined the
central theological link between reason and revelation. It questions the idea
that political freedom is founded on the thesis of relativism in which all
conceptions of common good have the same truth and the same value.
Crucially, it defends the right and duty of the believer to intervene in
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political decisions that undermine Catholic faith and codes of morality. The
Vatican challenges the legitimacy of laïcité by contesting its separation of
‘l’autonomie de la sphère civile et politique’ from ‘la sphère religieuse et
ecclésiastique’ (Vatican, 2002). In so doing, it defends what it sees as the
inextricable link between ‘vivre et agir politiquement’. 
This critique of laïcité is not confined to the Vatican. In a letter to the
President of the Republic, the Catholic bishops of France have addressed
problems with laïcité in respect of the affaire du foulard.4 Intimating Régis
Debray’s subsequent report to the Ministry of Education on the ‘fait religieux’ in
French schools, the bishops confirm, on the one hand, their respect for the
laïque vision, but, on the other hand, claim that laïcité has been responsible
for ‘constituting’ spaces (the school, for example) that have been consciously
emptied of religious dialogue, a claim which raises accusations of innate
intolerance within secularism. And yet, as we have seen, these current
conflicts between religion and politics have been at the heart of the secular
vision in France since the late 1960s. The 1967 special issue of Esprit
entitled Le Nouveau Monde et parole de Dieu conducted a survey on the
question ‘Y a-t-il une politique chrétienne?’ The responses were wide-ranging.
Generally, the tradition of laïcité was upheld as a worthy model of
impartiality. However, there was unease expressed as to the lack of a
spiritual significance in the engagement with the political (Esprit, 1967:
612). It was suggested that a ‘réinsertion du Christianisme dans l’actualité’
would be a welcome development but not in the sense of the establishment
of a Christian order.5 A special issue of Esprit in 1971 entitled Réinventer
l’Église reiterated the need for religious faith to engage socially and
politically. Citing Michel de Certeau, the editor Jean-Marie Domenach
announced: ‘L’Église a pour ce sens de manifester ce lien de nécessité entre
la confession d’une foi et une praxis sociale’ (Domenach, 1971: 792). It
would appear that post-1968 there was concern about the nature of the
relationship between ‘le projet politique’ and ‘le projet religieux’, and a
desire to connect the two. But clearly there was not enough of a consensus
on this proximity, nor did it seem the relationship was sufficiently thought
through and articulated to represent a serious challenge to the universality of
laïcité. However, by the mid-1980s (1985 and 1986), this proximity was
given a greater significance by the intensification of democracy in French
republicanism. Esprit, as we will see, was to reflect the optimism of an age
where the language of belief was to find a democratic voice in the ‘âge
égalitaire’.
The 1986 special issue of Esprit called La Religion . . . sans retour ni
détour is a critical document in the history of the relationship between
laïcité and religion in France. Firstly, it heralded a crisis in laïcité in respect
of the ‘retour du religieux’. Secondly, the ‘retour du religieux’ became an
opportunity to draw up a different road map for religion, away from the
notion of religion coming back miraculously from the past, and towards
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addressing the false equivalence of a ‘modernité = irreligion éclairée’ (Eslin,
Mongin and Schlegel, 1986: 8). Jean-Louis Schlegel was adamant that laïcité
was here to stay, indeed ‘un fait acquis et irréversible’ (Schlegel, 1986: 9).
But, critically, this irreversibility did not imply that laïcité could not and
should not change. The challenge, as described by Schlegel, was to invent
‘des révolutions du croyable’ that would eternalise the notion of ‘croire’ as a
constant thorn in the side of laïcité. However, more than this, the 1986
special issue of Esprit brought together the religious and political projects in
a way unforeseen up to that point. Out of the mix of equality of rights,
individual freedoms and differences emerged a specific ‘individualisme
démocratique’ of the ‘croyant’. This new-found status of the ‘croyant’ was set
in:
une époque où il apparaît que la crise de l’État assistance, qui est d’abord
celle des normes collectives susceptibles de relier les individus autour de
valeurs communes, oblige à inventer de nouvelles formes de déliberation
collective respectant les exigences individuelles. Non pas que la laïcité
ait perdu du terrain, que l’autonomie politique soit remise en cause, la
séparation du religieux et de l’État soupçonnée, mais la vie publique n’est
plus arrimée à des valeurs collectives (une éthique républicaine par
exemple) en rapport auxquelles l’individu, le citoyen organise ses choix
et prend des décisions. (Eslin, Mongin and Schlegel, 1986: 3)
We have seen in Esprit examples of a desire for greater proximity between
religion and politics throughout the 1960s and 1970s, but it would appear
that it was not until the mid-1980s that a more structured link between the
two was established along the lines of the rights of a minority group within
the republican/democratic dialectic. Debray’s ground-breaking article ‘ tes-
vous démocrate ou républicain? (Debray, 1989) testified to a new realignment
in France’s political tectonic plates. It would be my contention, therefore,
that the post-1986 period represented a new departure for religion and
religious debate in France. Beyond the historically organic solidarity
between democratic politics and religious tolerance, the democratisation of
the ‘croyant’ provided a platform from which to voice a legitimate opposition to
laïcité. This democratisation did not involve the politicisation of a religious
discourse per se. This discourse, as we shall see in the case of Catholicism,
was to assume doctrinal and theological dimensions. What had changed,
however, was that this discourse was now being re-signified in the light of a
different political narrative.
As early as the special issue of Esprit in 1986, some contributors were
fleshing out the possibility of a new religious language that could be offered
as an olive branch to secularism. Schlegel speaks of secularism as not being
a total void for religious debate, but potentially a place of plenitude: ‘la
société sécularisée n’appelle pas le vide des religions, mais leur plein’
(Schelgel, 1986: 23). Guy Petitdemange is more specific in his identification
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of a trend in religious thinking ‘dont la dynamique est la mémoire’ and
whose language, while not of this world, ‘oblige à s’opérer dans ce monde’
(Petitdemange, 1986: 87). In its editorial, the search for a new ‘identification
d’elle-même . . . tant au plan théoloqique que philosophique’ (Eslin, Mongin,
Schlegel, 1986: 14) is carefully balanced against ‘a grammaire chrétienne’
that respects the cultural, historical and aesthetic Christianity of the past.
This duality between forging a new identity and an obligation to bow to the
historical legacy of Christianity, produced, I would argue, an immobilism
that characterised the ‘croyant’ in the mid-1980s. The ‘croyant’ was caught
between a new religious ‘droit de parole’ gifted to him by democratisation,
and a dutiful self-imposed ‘aphasie’. I would suggest that this immobilism
not only stunted the progress of a religious identity but it has subsequently
made it prey to social and cultural diversification. 
We can see that by 1997, and the special issue of Esprit called Le Temps
des religions sans Dieu, France is a place where traditional monotheisms
have been marginalised by other forms of esoteric religiosity. The editorial
underlines the further marginalisation of the symbolic and spiritual
elements that have structured the lives of French generations. French and
European democracies, it claims, have lost the spiritual and intellectual
properties common to their histories. To compound this picture, a survey
carried out on the nature of the ‘retour du privé’ reveals that individualism
is not solely a product of modernity and postmodernity, but also a symptom
of Catholic and Christian oppression, which in turn have produced a spirit
of rebellion in matters of the body, self-realisation and self-determination.
According to the survey, there is the perception that the crisis of
individualism is seen, at least by the Catholic church, as much as a crisis of
its own making as it is a function of the postmodern age and a secular
France. And clearly, as the survey confirms, laïcité has not helped in its
creation of conditions of religious marginalisation and the decline of
religious practice, rites, beliefs and the visibility of the church. The vacuum
created by the absence of a consensus on a specific religious identity in the
1980s was filled by the fracturing effects of postmodernity. In the process,
the lines of transmission by which faith, religious traditions and knowledge
were traditionally acquired became blurred. It is against this backdrop of an
embryonic religious ‘identification’ in the mid-1980s, and its malfunction in
the 1990s and beyond, that a current crisis in the transmission of belief and
faith has emerged. And yet, faced with this religious implosion, it is my
contention that in recent times the Catholic church, and specifically the
Vatican, has adopted an offensive strategy to re-educate Catholics, not by an
accommodation of liberal progressiveness but by a return to strict theological
doctrine, a trend which appears set to continue under the pontificate of
Benedict XVI. While this strategy has angered and alienated many Catholics,
its one positive effect has been to foreground important theological tenets, in
particular the centrality of reason in the transmission of faith, knowledge
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and ethics, and how reason may represent the key to a reassessment of the
values of laïcité in France. 
L’enseignement du religieux n’est pas un enseignement religieux  
In 2002, Régis Debray submitted a report to the Ministry of Education
entitled L’Enseignement du fait religieux dans l’école laïque (Debray, 2002).
In very general terms the report made a case for the teaching of religion in
schools on the basis that there is an apparently broad public consensus for it,
and also because there is a perception that many young French school
students are growing up in a non-religious context where they know little
about their religious past. As a result, their knowledge of the present and
future is severely impoverished. Among the report’s twelve recommendations,
Debray calls for the establishment of an Institut européen en sciences et
religions and, most controversially, for the introduction of two compulsory
modules (‘laïcité et religion’ and ‘philosophie de la laïcité et histoire des
religions’) to be taken by teachers as part of their teacher training. From a
secular perspective, the report was heavily criticised for compromising the
laïque principle of freedom of thought over religious freedom.6
It is no surprise that Debray’s report was not well received by laïcs.
However, his report needs to be evaluated within the broader context we
sketched earlier of a theological religious discourse, a boundary-free post-
modernity, and how religion might become a natural and reasoned ally of
laïcité. The report is a subtle and complex argument, democratic and
republican in direction, and it weaves a labyrinthine path between the
virtues of laïcité and their simultaneous erosion. The report opens with an
appeal to laïcité’s tradition of objectivity and tolerance, and a concern for the
loss of religious tradition, values and morality in contemporary secular
culture. The ‘fait religieux’ is invoked as a potential enhancement of laïcité,
but, in the same breath, Debray is careful to allay laïque fears of hidden
agendas. He advances his argument tentatively by suggesting that religion
and laïcité could become partners. This ‘reasonable’ hypothesis is explored
through a correlation Debray makes between laïcité’s objectivity and reason
itself. 
Critically, reason is identified in its links to revelation.7 This identification
is an important development in Debray’s argument because it locates reason
and religion in a context that is alien to laïcité’s understanding of their
mutual exclusivity, but intrinsic to a Catholic theological tradition. The late
Pope John Paul II, arguably the most philosophical of recent pontiffs, wrote
extensively on this link. He sets up a twofold order of knowledge, natural
reason and divine faith (John Paul II, 1998: 9); faith in God’s revelation
surpasses all knowledge proper to human reason. John Paul II characterises
reason as having its own autonomy and scope for action, but reason is
defined as being constrained and limited by original sin. Faith, however, not
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based on human reason but unable to do without it, is seen to liberate reason
in so far as it allows reason to attain correctly what it seeks to know and
place it within the ultimate order of God’s revelation (John Paul II, 1998: 20).
The report’s implicit religious (Catholic) underpinning to reason is qualified
quickly by Debray’s re-assertion that ‘le fait religieux’ in education is not
designed to usurp the secular tradition. However, by its very suggestion early
in the report, Debray has carefully planted a theory of religious ‘knowledge’
within laïcité. From the outset, he wishes to dispel a myth that religion and
laïcité are not good partners. However, as readers, we are made aware that
Debray wants to cultivate their connection; to link ‘le fait religieux’ to the
objective ‘transmission des connaissances’ is a rationale that laïcité will have
difficulty avoiding.8
The tradition of linking reason to revelation is well established. We have
seen in the course of this article how Milbank, Meynel, Hervieu-Léger and Pope
John Paul II (1993) have used reason to forge a very specific type of religious
discourse linked to the concept of truth in the revelation of the resurrection. On
the basis of this theological rationale, Debray is able to advance his theory that
religion cannot be excluded from laïcité on the basis that it cannot participate
in the rationally controlled, public transmission of knowledge (my italics) in
the republican school: ‘la relégation du fait religieux hors des enceintes de la
transmission rationnelle et publiquement contrôlée des connaissances, favorise
la pathologie du terrain au lieu de l’assainir . . . S’abstenir n’est pas guérir’
(Debray, 2002: 12). The second main thrust of Debray’s report is the link he
establishes between religious faith and knowledge. Much is made in the report
and among critics of the report of the need for a separation between faith and
knowledge: specifically, that the pursuit of the latter in the republican school
should be free from religious influence. Debray contests this assumption. One
of the ways he does this is through a discussion of culture. The laïque tradition,
he claims, is suffering from an ‘inculture religieuse’, or religious ignorance. A
more worrying ailment is the ‘culture de l’extension’, a form of ‘knowledge’ that
is achieved through over-exposure to the media and televisual zapping,
symptoms of the technological age that privilege space over time. This
temporal/spatial opposition is a theme used throughout the report to indicate a
different approach to forms of knowledge acquired either immediately through
the ‘culture de l’extension’ or through culture as a ‘continuité cumulative’
(Debray, 2002: 5). The horizontal and pejorative association of spatial know-
ledge is contrasted with the temporal and positive association of vertical
knowledge, a form of knowledge that embraces transcendence and reflection,
and therefore a knowledge to which the ‘fait religieux’ is linked. Through the
debate on knowledge Debray wants to dispel the myth that faith and knowledge
cannot co-exist in laïcité: 
Pas plus que le savant et le témoin ne s’invalident l’un l’autre, l’approche
objectivante et l’approche confessante ne se font concurrence, pourvu
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que les deux puissent exister et prospérer simultanément . . . Preuve en
est que les deux peuvent coexister dans certaines personnes (un exégète
peut être critique et ordonné). L’optique de la foi et l’optique de la
connaissance ne font pas un jeu à somme nulle. (Debray, 2002: 13)
Debray’s argument for the co-existence between ‘savant’ and ‘témoin’ is at
the heart of this report. But as an idea it also reaches out to previous debates
in this article on the spiritualisation of politics, on the role of the ‘croyant’ in
a democracy, on the ‘praxis chrétienne’, and on the politico-religious axis in
general. We should not forget, of course, that this co-existence is played out
in the school and personified in the teacher. And yet, for Debray, the school,
distinct from the relatively free space of the university, exemplifies the
uniqueness of the laïque tradition with its emphasis on ‘la libre pensée’ and
‘la mise entre parenthèses des convictions personnelles’ (Debray, 2002: 14).
Debray articulates the dilemma of the teacher in laïcité as follows: ‘Donner à
connaître une réalité ou une doctrine est une chose, promouvoir une norme
ou un idéal en est une autre’ (Debray, 2002: 14). The issue, for Debray, boils
down to knowledge; the teacher (and by implication the concept of
knowledge in the republican school) has laboured under a private/public
division. On the one hand, there is the private knowledge associated with
religious belief. It is defined by a self-reflexive (‘interne’) discourse;
cloistered and self-referential, it is a discourse without external referent or
need for public dissemination. It is defined by its self-worth, its intellectual
consciousness and it is a discourse cultivated by the ‘témoin’. On the other
hand, there is knowledge that is defined by the fact that it is a common,
shared knowledge. For Debray, this is ‘savant’ knowledge, approved and
standardised by laïcité and the school as having a valid public function in
‘enseignement général’, ‘pratique ordinaire’, and ‘niveau moyen’.
Implicitly, laïcité is charged with constructing a purity of knowledge.
One-dimensional, selective and homogeneous, laïcité is perceived as defending
the incompatibility of the knowledge of religious belief with a knowledge fit
for public consumption. It is a perception grounded on two controversial
notions: firstly, that belief can prejudice the objective transmission of
knowledge, and secondly that belief is without conceptual rigour and
intellectual rationale. In defence of laïcité, the notion of the incorruptibility
of knowledge at the point of delivery to the school child is intellectually
honest and laudable. Supporters of laïcité point to its rational, scientific
basis, the benefits of universalism over particularism, and the dangers of
dogmatic belief (Frelat-Khan, 1996). Debray takes a different line to the
conventional debates on laïcité. Traditionally, laïcité is viewed either
democratically, where the school should resemble civil society (Valadier,
1999) or, from the republican perspective, where society should resemble the
school as a space of public and private separation (Péna-Ruiz, 1998). For
Debray, the debate has more to do with knowledge and how laïcité’s
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objective ‘purity’ is founded on the idea that religious belief compromises
this ‘purity’ of knowledge on the grounds that belief is an irrational
discourse. Debray, in the tradition of Catholic theology, contests the artificial
construction of private/public knowledge by claiming that the two represent
‘les deux lames trop écartées du même ciseau’ (Debray, 2002: 18). Pope John
Paul II was more precise: ‘CREDO UT INTELLEGAM’ (John Paul II, 1998:
27). Debray proffers his alternative model of indivisible knowledge,
intimating that for laïcité to oppose the rational link between ‘témoin’ and
‘savant’ would indicate intolerance and discrimination. In short, Debray
appeals to the democratic credentials of laïcité to accommodate ‘le fait
religieux’ (private knowledge) with an argument that seeks to make laïcité
more laïque than it already is.
What Debray understands by ‘le fait religieux’ and its specific role in
laïcité reaches a climax towards the end of the report. He puts laïcité on its
well-established pedestal, with ‘liberté de conscience’ in pride of place. But
he challenges laïcité’s definition of liberty by suggesting that liberty has a
responsibility (in the interests of ‘l’expérience humaine’) to safeguard young
people and future generations from ‘analphabétisme religieux’ (Debray, 2002:
19). In effect, Debray appeals to the principle of ‘liberté de conscience’ in
laïcité to validate the study of religion, by underlining his perception that
laïcité and religion are not opposites. He asks: ‘Aussi ne peut-on séparer
principe de laïcité et étude du religieux?’ (Debray, 2002: 19). Debray reinforces
his argument by allaying the fears of suspicious laïcs through an appeal to
belief and reason. Belief, he implies, is not a mystical pursuit; rather, it is
one in which reason is closely allied to its understanding. By its association
with reason, belief becomes synonymous with self-awareness, cultural
heritage, ‘la lumière sur l’obscur’. To reject this association is, for Debray, to
invoke a form of laïcité that is ‘complexée par ses conditions de naissance’;
in other words, a laïcité that sees in belief a ‘déraison’, and a laïcité that is
steeped in a culture of rejection of belief and religious inclusion. For Debray,
laïcité, as it is in France today, is ‘demarquée de l’anti-religion militante’
(Debray, 2002: 21). But what Debray advocates is not a platitudinous
democratisation of laïcité (‘une laïcité plurielle, ouverte et repentante’)9 but,
ironically, a return to its republican roots: ‘Enseigner à cette enseigne, c’est
retrouver la “haute époque” des lois laïques et républicaines qui déboucha
justement sur la création d’une section autonome de l’École pratique, en
1886, destinée à étudier, sur un mode non-théologique, les phénomènes
religieux’ (Debray, 2002: 21, my italics).
The teaching of religious phenomena in a non-theological way is Debray’s
compromise with laïcité in the republican school, in that it ensures that
religious ‘phenomena’ will be taught but without any theological inflection.
But it is a subtle compromise because, for Debray, the term ‘phénomènes
religieux’ implies the study of the historical contextualisation of religion; in
short, ‘religious study’ is underpinned by necessary intellectual and rigorous
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discipline. As a compromise couched in the language of a return to the
republican ideals of the Third Republic, Debray assuages the concerns of his
laïque readers by saying that there is no need for modernisation or
democratisation of laïcité. Instead, it is a question of ‘ressourcement’ and of
laïcité to be ‘refondée, ragaillardée, réassurée d’elle-même et de ses propres
valeurs’ (Debray, 2002: 22). In defending the republican traditions of the
French school, we might ask whether Debray extends this defence to
embrace a wider republican agenda of a universal and indivisible concept of
knowledge. This cannot be discounted, but it would be my view that a
republican interpretation is overridden by a theological defence of
knowledge. Debray’s defence of the republican school has a democratic logic
in that he is actually defending the democratisation of religion in the
instruction of religious studies. This is an argument for the rationalisation of
religion (as ‘phénomène’) in laïcité, an argument that laïcité has thus far
been unwilling to countenance. 
Conclusion 
As Esprit has been the main journal of debate for these issues and for this
article, it seems appropriate to return to a recent article in this journal as part
of my conclusion. Phillipe Capelle and Henry-Jérôme Gagey respond to
Debray’s report by setting up the university (with its emphasis on an
epistemological approach to religious study) as a comparative space where
religion and the study of it are embedded in a rational, disciplined and
scientific discourse. Clearly, the republican school and university operate
under different rules, but these co-authors use the university model as a
parallel structure in order to highlight the artificiality (as they see it) in the
laïque school of the division between ‘confessant’ and laïc. In a tightly
argued article that attests to the historical institutionalisation of the French
university based on a reciprocity between faith and reason, the authors meet
part of the challenge of Debray’s report, which is to answer the question
whether one can, in an educational environment, be ‘universitaire’ and
‘confessant’. The authors are keen to underline the fact that one can teach
‘les phénomènes religieux’10 and also express a personal religious belief,
neither of which should compromise laïcité nor one’s professionalism. And
the key to their argument, as it is with Debray’s report, is that, in the context
of ‘la transmission rationnelle et publiquement contrôlée des connaissances’
(Debray, 2002: 12) (which is the criterion by which laïcité is seen to operate
in the school), religious belief and Catholicism in particular have a
legitimate, objective and intellectual rationale that justifies their equal
‘transmission’ in school.11 The crux of the debate therefore is not about
whether belief and religion should be private concerns or whether they
prejudice public knowledge, but whether belief constitutes a knowledge and
whether it can be defined rationally.
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Capelle and Gagey call for new spaces of ‘objectivation’ removed from the
‘voix unique et officielle’ of laïque objectivity. But they also call for a rethink
of the concept of knowledge. Debray’s articulation of knowledge as the union
of ‘témoin’ and ‘savant’ (two parts of the same scissors) is reinforced by
Capelle and Gagey who state that to be ‘universitaire’ and ‘confessant’
constitutes ‘un élément dialogal indispensable’ (Capelle and Gagey, 2004:
64). Debray and these co-authors reject the apartheid of knowledge in the
republican school. It is seen to promote a ‘laïcité d’incompétence’. By contrast,
they see in faith, belief and the study of religion a tradition of religious
knowledge grounded in Catholic theology and philosophy, and a current
political context that promotes the democratisation of this knowledge in the
form of a ‘laïcité d’intelligence’.    
Notes
1. The use of the word ‘culture’ in connection with religion is problematic. In particular, it
raises debates about the use of derivative terms (‘inculturation’ and ‘acculturation’). Pope
John Paul II deployed the term ‘inculturation’ in both his encyclicals Veritatis Splendor
and Fides et Ratio to indicate the evangelisation of a transcendent, universal culture of
truth in revelation, and therefore a culture that is not circumscribed by time or place. For
more on this and related terms, see Gittens (2004).
2. Zygmunt Bauman describes this process as ‘this-worldly transcendence’ in Bauman
(1997).
3. In recent years, the Vatican has published a host of documents relating to sexual mores,
the couple, the family and the role of Catholics in public life (Vatican 1986, 2000, 2002,
2003).
4. Lettre des trois co-présidents du Conseil d’Églises chrétiennes en France sur la laïcité, au
Président de la République, M. Jacques Chirac, 8 décembre 2003. For more on the
Catholic Church in France, see the official website: cef.fr.
5. Other contributors highlighted the need to redefine faith as an element of intellectual
consciousness. Another issue raised was the perception of a difference between ‘Dire de
l’Église’ and ‘Faire de l’Église’, a distinction highlighted by Merleau-Ponty’s celebrated
phrase ‘agir en Chrétien ou agir en tant que Chrétien’ (Esprit, 1967: 630).
6. Benoît Mély criticised the report for being biased towards Catholic/Protestant and state
perceptions of what is ‘religieux’ (Mély, 2002). He questioned one of Debray’s postulates
that belief in transcendence is an ‘invariant’ of the human condition, without which the
individual is in a state of ‘incomplétude’. In an ironic twist, Mély calls for compulsory
modules on ‘inculture laïque’ and ‘l’histoire de l’incroyance’ which protect free
examination, critical independence and the free assessment of other religious figures in
the nation’s collective memory. Jean LeFranc in ‘Quel fait? Quelles religions?’ sees
Debray’s real agenda in this report as an attempt to address intolerance in France and
restore civil peace to a society fractured along religious lines. Nadine Wainer in ‘Laïcité et
le rapport Debray’ accuses Debray of trying to re-enchant the world, and of a paternalistic
attitude to teachers. She highlights the end of the role of school as a place of liberation,
but also its failure to construct an autonomous space of thought. These texts were
consulted in November 2004 at the following websites: www.appep.net/lefranc.pdf and
www.appep.net/wainer.pdf.
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7. Veritatis Splendor and Fides et Ratio are two of Pope John Paul II’s most philosophical
texts. They set out in particular his views on reason, faith and their inseparability. Faith
is seen to liberate reason. Reason is perceived to have some autonomy and scope for
action but the freedom of reason is predisposed to revelation. Interestingly, the editorial
of Esprit (La Croisée des religions) in 1999, while welcoming the advent of rational
thought into recent Vatican thinking, questions some aspects of the encyclical Fides et
Ratio, in particular the ‘propédeutique’ relationship between reason and revelation.
8. Monod (1999) comments on the state of laïcité in France today, and particularly its fears
about the precarious state of the separation of church and state. He voices concerns about
a new ‘retour du religieux’ and other theocratic and ‘intégriste’ forms of religion. 
9. Kintzler (1996) is equally dismissive of a laïcité that goes too far in the direction of a
cultural laïcité where the school is seen to be a reflection of society. Like other
commentators (Paul Valadier, Paul Ricoeur, Péna-Ruiz), she expresses reservations about
moves to interfere with a teacher’s ‘devoir de réserve’, particularly from the perspective of
vulnerable children who are not old enough to act as free citizens.
10. Their use of ‘phénomènes religieux’ as opposed to ‘le fait religieux’ is a qualification to
Debray’s report. They see the use of the term ‘le fait religieux’ as a weak link in his
argument. ‘Phénomènes religieux’ point to time, place and circumstance that need critical
and rational evaluation in the perception of religious belief and study. 
11. Debray’s approach to the equality of transmission of knowledge exposes him to the charge
of promoting a secularised conception of knowledge. I think this charge undervalues the
rational and theological argument underpinning the specificity of religious knowledge.
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